Dealing with Awkward Relations

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Abstract: Are we seeing a move in economic sociology from the idea of embeddedness to that of relational work? If so, is this a good idea? I argue that an economic sociology focused on relational work has the potential to open fresh ways of thinking about central questions in social theory in much the same way that Mark Granovetter’s seminal paper on embeddedness did more than twenty five years ago (Granovetter 1985). But there are more and less interesting ways that this way of thinking might develop. The less interesting route is, unfortunately, the easiest one to take. For something more interesting to happen, we should avoid treating relational work as—variously—a rhetorical banner, a catch-all term, or a euphemism for a needlessly restricted sort of cultural sociology of economic life. To fulfill its potential, advocates of relational work should focus on strategic and conflictual elements that are present in the perspective but typically overlooked.

RELATIONAL WORK VS EMBEDDEDNESS

In her work over the past decade or so, Viviana Zelizer has developed the concept of “relational work” as a way of encapsulating and generalizing some of the lessons of her influential studies of people’s economic lives. This goal, as she describes it (Zelizer, 2011, 2012), is to understand how people connect, or are connected by, four elements in economic life: social ties between people or groups; sets of economic transactions across those ties; various media of exchange used in these transactions; and the social, often moralized meanings associated with particular bundles of these media, transactions, and ties. Relational work “consists in creating viable matches” between these elements (Zelizer, 2012, p. 151). Thus, an economic sociology of relational work seeks to describe, understand, and explain the various ways people bring these elements together.

For example, one of the practices Zelizer has looked at most closely in her own research is the earmarking of money for particular purposes. “[E]armarking corresponds to the socially-constructed boundaries of social relations: each of these currencies
is acceptable for only some social relations and transactions. Monetary earmarking, thus, is a relational practice by which people perform relational work” (Zelizer, 2012, p. 158). In Zelizer’s view, earmarking is a pervasive phenomenon in economic life. It is a way of creating, maintaining, and signalling the social relations implicated in different kinds of monetary exchange. It is not the only way people do relational work, although it is one of the most important. The earmarking of money is a direct expression of the importance and robustness of sociability in exchange, something that—given the enormous influence of the “Nothing But” and “Hostile Worlds” understandings of the market she has criticized elsewhere (Zelizer, 1988, 2005)—people were surprised to discover alive and well in the realm of the market.

That is the general idea of “relational work”. Recently, a group of scholars have begun to explore whether an economic sociology built with these concepts might succeed the “embeddedness” framework developed by Mark Granovetter. Block (2012) and Bandelj (2012) make the case for the general applicability relational approach, with Wherry (2012), Whitford (2012), Biscotti, Lacy, Glenna, & Welsh (2012), and Haylett (2012) applying the approach in diverse settings, including egg donation, research collaborations between universities and companies, handicraft and art markets, and European manufacturing districts. Research framed in terms of one sort of embeddedness or another has dominated research in the field for the past quarter-century. The questions at hand, then, are whether economic sociology needs a new orienting idea, and whether “relational work” is it.

**Concepts that are too useful**

To answer these questions—and to understand where the demand for a new framework for the field comes from in the first place—we can begin with what might be called the “maximalist” version of the embeddedness approach. As the New Economic Sociology got moving in the late 1980s, the concept of embeddedness grew along with it. New forms of it were perennially being discovered, like novel species of beetle. Over the years there have been numerous attempts to taxonomize (and critique) the myriad forms of embeddedness. I will not attempt to do that here. Suffice to say that as the notion of embeddedness gathered momentum and came to orient the field, attention to the details of the original argument soon gave way to generic citations to Granovetter (1985) as a sort of rallying cry, or badge of allegiance.

The career of the concept followed a common enough life-cycle for successful social-scientific theory, one nicely laid out in Rule (1997). On the timescale of academic generations, some particularly useful concepts or ideas take hold in communities of researchers. A great deal of empirical work is framed in terms of them. Scholarly effort, career competition, and the expectation that theory should be progressing lead to further conceptual elaboration of the original idea. The mainstream of American
sociology, in particular, has become quite wedded to the idea that an important piece of work should ideally contain both a new empirical finding and a name for whatever theoretical twist the finding allegedly exemplifies. Mere confirmation or disconfirmation of an existing idea is insufficient. Theory for its own sake is similarly dissatisfying. There is a tendency to specification-search for both significant findings and significant ideas.

This process of conceptual expansion and empirical extension leads people to grow tired of the original idea. What initially seemed like conceptual virtues—broad applicability, versatility, extensibility—begin to look like vices. The theory or concept now seems empty, precisely because there is nothing it cannot (superficially) explain. Its moment of intellectual triumph turns out to be a death-knell. The field moves on to something else.

Given how social science is done, there may be no way to avoid this happening to successful research programs. If that is so, nothing much is gained from worrying about it. Better to have your research program succeed in this way for a while, even if intellectual fashions ultimately change, or some Lakatosian degeneracy inevitably sets in by the end. Still, it would still be a pity if the new idea, the one that replaces the previous, overextended and exhausted one, were to be used right out of the gate in a manner more suited to the end of the conceptual life-cycle.

In the case of relational work, this might happen in one of two ways. First, it is tempting to examine economic exchanges in previously underexplored settings and present evidence that people are “engaging in” or “doing” relational work, but without saying with any specificity why it is they are doing it, or what the point of this work is. This way of using the concept rests content with labeling economic exchanges as richer, more complex or deeper than some simpler account would have you believe. The problem with this approach is that such complexities are always there to be found if looked for. Thin models of economic action are usually thin on purpose, and life is usually very messy by comparison.

A second option is to take cases that are already well-studied and just redescribe or relabel them using the new vocabulary. Block (2012, pp. 137–138), for instance, suggests that during the recent financial crisis, “interactions between prospective borrowers and mortgage brokers … relied on relational work that was highly routinized because mortgage companies had strong incentives to maximize the total quantity of loans”, with the consequence that “much of the traditional exchange of information … did not occur”. Block notes that “it is worth emphasizing that relational work is going on whether the parties are being completely honest or highly deceptive” and that information asymmetry is the term for the latter case. And so “it is worth emphasizing that relational work is going on whether the parties are being completely honest or highly deceptive. … we can make an analytic distinction between relational work that tends to maintain or increase informational asymmetries and relational work that
diminishes those informational asymmetries. … Just as relational work is neither good nor bad in itself, it also comes in more or less egalitarian varieties” (Block, 2012, p. 138).

While talking about these exchanges under the rubric of relational work is certainly possible, the challenge is showing what exactly is gained from speaking in these terms, as opposed to a more focused approach that picks out failures of professional responsibility, perverse incentives, lack of regulatory oversight, and so on.¹

These are ways that “relational work” could enter the slogan phase of its life much too early, leaving it open to the same criticisms that “embeddedness” was exposed to as it moved from a fairly well-specified social-structural concept to a generic orienting term. If nothing else, this would be unfair to Zelizer, given that her work is characterized by such a discerning eye.² Even if “relational work” succeeds to the point where it floats far away from its origins, I think we should not be too eager to inflate that balloon right at the beginning.

Is this Structure vs Culture again?

So much for the contrast with the embeddedness framework in its degenerate phase. What about a more substantive comparison of the core of each approach? An obvious way to contrast embeddedness and relational work—one already present in the literature—is to say they exemplify the bigger contrast between structural and cultural explanation in social theory. Seeing the matter this way this does reflect some facts about the state of economic sociology as a field. But I argue it tends to misrepresent both approaches. In particular it ignores how they set themselves against a common antagonist, and underplays how much they share a vision of what a social theory of economic life should be.

In an excellent discussion that links the substance of ideas in economic sociology to its social structure as an academic project, Marion Fourcade goes a long way towards explaining how entrenched this conventional contrast is in the field. She notes that “embeddedness” moved from a reasonably well-defined point of view to a generic label covering a very heterogeneous body of work, then continues:

[T]he enterprise and the label have been institutionally so successful that everyone claims to be on the inside. But the inside, just like every social enterprise, remains stratified too. … A recent study of citation patterns in

¹Note that Block presents the mortgage case as a brief and speculative example of the possibilities for the framework: he is not claiming to provide a full “relational work” explanation of the mortgage crisis.

²It did Granovetter a disservice when it happened to him, too, as his writing on the subject of embeddedness is very careful indeed. Of course neither is responsible for the interpretive sins of others, and much worse things can happen to your theoretical manifesto than having it become one of the most cited pieces of work in your field.
U.S. economic sociology in the 1980s and 1990s by Convert & Heilbron (2005) shows the core of the field is still very firmly located among people broadly associated with the study of markets and organizations. By contrast, questions about, say, gender or consumption seem to occupy a much more peripheral position … Second, scholars located in business schools are featured very prominently … which suggests that the revival of economic sociology has occurred in the context of a general redefinition of sociology’s institutional position within the university. Third, if network analysis remains dominant throughout the period, the trend during the 1990s was toward diversification, marked by a comparative rise of neoinstitutional and cultural approaches. (Fourcade, 2007, pp. 1017–18)

Fourcade argues that the social locations of participants in the field are homologous with clear differences in theoretical orientation and empirical focus. (She is not saying that the axes she identifies have intrinsic merit as ways of dividing the field, just that the field is structured this way in practice.) This opposition between structural and cultural views can be seen in thumbnail form in many of the literature reviews, theoretical discussions, and capsule summaries that survey the field.³

A suspiciously familiar contrast emerges. Granovetterian analyses look at the embeddedness of market actors in networks at the core of market economies; Zelizerian approaches examine meanings shared amongst marginal actors at the periphery of economic life. The embeddedness approach examines how trust (Uzzi, 1996, 1997) or social capital (Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993) or entrepreneurial opportunities (Burt, 1992) arise from particular configurations within social networks. Relational work, by contrast, is principally concerned with the social meaning of exchange, especially cases where exchange is delicate, or exotic, or bumps up against some messy domestic arena or intimate sphere. The embeddedness approach tends toward quantitative measures of the structure and density of social ties. Studies of relational work have an affinity with close readings and qualitative fieldwork. Embeddedness is found round and about corporations, commodity markets, bankers, securities analysts, and managers. Relational work is done by carers, credit unions, blood donors, sex workers, and mothers.

³As Fourcade (2007, pp. 1019–24) makes clear, this broadly structural vs broadly cultural axis is not the only division that gives shape to the field of economic sociology. Other lines of work have long been present, and periodically central. Some more recent entrants have had a big impact, too. An example of the former is neoinstitutionalist scholarship, which originated at the intersection of organizational sociology and the sociology of culture. It connected with economic sociology early on and in a sustained way. An example of the latter is performativist scholarship from the surge of interest in financial markets amongst sociologists of science. It opened up a new front of research and argument beginning in the late 1990s. In addition, and until recently notable more for their conspicuous absence (or exclusion), are scholars of the political economy of capitalism, and research on stratification.
I claim this characterization is plausible less for substantive reasons and more because of contingent facts about the way some larger sections of the American Sociological Association have related to one another over the past quarter century. In truth, it is not hard to think of work that incorporates elements from each side—ethnographies of bond traders, network analyses of sex workers—as well as research that does not fit well in this space at all. But when people want to describe the difference between the two approaches it is easy to reach for the contrast between structure and culture, and all that comes along with it.

_They’re more alike than you think_

In fact, embeddedness and relational work have a great deal in common because they share the same antagonists. Consider, briefly, how the arguments go in each case. Granovetter (1985) contrasts under- and over-socialized conceptions of actors, and tries to find a third way—the embeddedness approach—between the two. In the under-socialized view, he argues, people are utilitarian, self-interested, and disconnected from one another. This disconnection is seen either as something that actually exists in the world, or are something imposed by assumption in the process of theorizing. Either way, removing what Granovetter calls the “frictional drag” of social relations smooths the path for _homo economicus_.

In the over-socialized view, meanwhile people are guided (or held in check) by what Granovetter calls the “generalized morality” they carry around in their heads. Depending on the tastes and inclinations of the oversocializing theorists, these “social influences” might be conceived of as the weight of custom, the bonds of mutual obligation, norms of fairness, or the fetters of class ideology. Whatever they are, their effect is to keep the motive of self-interest (or the institution of the market) at bay. All of them—in Granovetter’s view, wrongly—have been seen by sociologists and economists alike as carried around in the heads of otherwise disconnected individuals. Rejecting both these views, Granovetter argues that his embeddedness view focuses on “attempts at purposive action embedded in systems of ongoing, concrete social relations” (487), without falling into the trap of substituting “one kind of optimistic functionalism for another” (491). It emphasizes attention to the local detail of social relations, eschewing “large-scale questions about the nature of modern society or the sources of economic and social change” in favor of a “more detailed understanding … explicating proximate causes of patterns of macro-level interest” (506-7).

Zelizer does not frame her case explicitly in terms of under- and over-socialized conceptions of action (Zelizer, 1988, 2005). Yet her goals are very similar to Granovetter’s. She begins with a critique of the “Nothing But” view of exchange, where the price-theoretic blowtorch is supposed to melt away the marshmallow-like layer of sentiment surrounding the family, religion, romantic relationships, or any other in-
stitution, revealing—as in Granovetter’s discussion of the under-socialized view of exchange—nothing but atomized, rational actors underneath.

The second target of Zelizer’s critique is the “Hostile Worlds” view. On this account, the market is supposed to be a corrosive force that is more or less successfully resisted by some countervailing institutional or cultural bulwark. And as before, in the case of Granovetter’s critique of “generalized morality”, Zelizer sees Hostile Worlds theorists identifying, variously, the domestic sphere, social norms, tradition, or the sacred as filling this defensive role. Once again rejecting both these views, Zelizer argues for as a third way: a relational work approach that emphasizes “a view of connected lives with [an] intertwining of economic transactions and personal ties” (Zelizer, 2011, p. 358).

The parallels are clear. Both approaches set themselves against theories that deny the importance of social relations in contemporary economic life, where social relations are conceived of as structured, persistent ties between actual individuals. Both reject models of social action that idealize either pure self-interest or all-enveloping social “meaning”. Each essentially argues that the right account of how order emerges in exchange has been unproductively displaced either by a Becker-like *Homo Economicus* or a Parsonian *Homo Sociologicus*. Both seek some third, specifically relational alternative, one explicitly focused on local conditions and local connections. Both eschew very macro-level accounts of economic structure in favor of close attention to how the structure of social relations is organized and expressed in particular settings.

**AWKWARD RELATIONS: AN EXAMPLE**

Granovetter’s and Zelizer’s views are not the same. Their intellectual styles are different, too, as are the specifics of their scholarly genealogies and influences. However, they share a great deal when it comes to diagnosing the approaches that they reject, and this lends more similarity to their thinking than is generally realized. To make the point, let us turn to a more detailed example of where embeddedness and relational work meet. This case lets us see some of the unsolved problems faced by both approaches. It also shows—or so I shall argue—why thinking in terms of relational work, rather than embeddedness, might stand a better chance of solving them.

In a fascinating article, Chan (2009) describes the creation and early development of a market for life insurance in China in the late 1990s. The case is of obvious interest to partisans of both embeddedness and relational work. The parallels with the insurance market in 19th century America are clear to anyone who has read Zelizer (1979). And for those interested in the social structure of economic action, China is of course a rich case for illustrating the embeddedness of economic action in social relations.

Here is the story. The insurance corporation AIG came to China in the 1990s and recruited agents to sell its products. Few in China knew what life insurance
was at the time, and hardly anyone liked the idea of talking openly about contracts involving death. So, agents sold policies to their close relatives. These relatives trusted the sales agent, even though the policies were not cheap. Often, the sale was agreed with little or no discussion of the details of the policy, or even of what life insurance actually was. Importantly, agents deliberately did not mention the 40 percent ongoing commission they would earn from each policy they sold. Some sellers did feel misgivings about this, but in general they did not feel so bad that it stopped them from making sales. Enough policies were sold in this way that a market began to emerge, and AIG sought to increase the number of sales agents.

Given this situation, Chan’s article tries to explain how so many sales agents acted like this in the land of guanxi and filial piety. She shows that neither the structural constraints of relationally-embedded trust, on the one hand, nor generalized morality of familial respect, on the other, were sufficient to prevent sellers from taking advantage of close relatives. Indeed, strongly embedded kinship ties, and the cultural tropes of familial respect associated with them, were treated by sales agents as something more like strategic resources. AIG’s sales force drew on these ties and tropes in a dynamic and skillful way when making their pitches. It was only when the terms of the deal were accidentally publicized by the insurance company itself, in its effort to recruit even more sellers, that the terms of the deal became widely known. (More recruits were needed because, as the market expanded, the original cohort of agents more or less ran out of grandmothers to sell insurance to.) The result was an immediate controversy that quickly ended the practice of selling to close relatives. After that, the market became more formally regulated and agents began to sell more extensively to acquaintances and strangers.

A case like this contains challenges for partisans of both embeddedness and relational work. From a Granovetterian point of view, levels of trust between buyers and sellers should rise and fall with the degree of relational embeddedness. In the simplest case, the stronger the tie, the greater the trust there is between participants and the better the exchange goes for all involved. More often, scholars argue for a more sophisticated “Goldilocks” version of this picture (one that Chan endorses). Being too strongly or too weakly tied to an exchange partner is likely to cause trouble. Instead, the balance needs to be just right for things to work properly (Uzzi, 1997). Being over-embedded is a problem because it makes actors less likely to exploit opportunities (or because it makes them wait too long to act, or because it drags them down with the alter they are bound to). If this is one’s view, the challenge in this case is to explain why the insurance agents took advantage of their close relatives, even though they were tightly linked to them. The trust created by patterns of strong ties within families

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¹My summary is more sharply-drawn than Chan would likely be comfortable with, but it is not inaccurate.
should be symmetrical. Such ties are built up out of a flow of exchanges over time between close relations.\(^5\) The sellers should have felt bound by the strong ties, just as the buyers are supposed to have been. Moreover, if there were to be any asymmetry of trust and obligation, norms of filial piety should mean that they run in the direction of children being more respectful of and trusting of their elders rather than the other way around.

Instead, the sales agents ripped off their own grandmothers. When discussing the buyers, Chan speaks in terms of “reflexive trust” rooted in the structure of social relations. But when discussing the sellers and their actions, she switches to the idea that respect for one’s elders is a cluster of meaningful associations that can be strategically enacted when needed. This leaves the article with an unresolved asymmetry. If the sellers deftly invoked cultural schemas about family and friendship in order to get a sale, why were the buyers also not more interactionally strategic? Why were they so willing to pay up, even though they literally did not know what they were buying? Conversely, if buyers were willing to buy because of the strength of their deep social ties to the sellers, why were the agents not also bound by this force?

Chan tries to solve the problem by linking the meaningfulness of social relations to social distance between actors—that is, by appealing to a nominally Zelizerian view of culture:

First, individual actors differentiate among the meanings, operating rules, and boundaries that separate one relation from another [zelizer/spurchofintim]. It is postulated that the meanings that define and the operating rules that govern various tie strengths can be marked at points on a continuum between ethical-affective and instrumental-monetary domains. Strong ties are defined by a high degree of affections and ethical obligations. Very weak ties or arm’s-length ties, however, are defined by a high degree of instrumental and monetary capacities. (Chan, 2009, p. 717)

Chan notes that “although intimate circles operate primarily in the ethical-affective domain, they serve important instrumental functions”. But she quickly returns to the

\(^5\)Note that Granovetter (1985, pp. 490–1) recognizes the problem: “… continuing economic relations often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism. It would never occur to us to doubt this last point in more intimate relations, which make behavior more predictable … [I]n the case of the burning houses featured on the 11:00pm news, we never hear that everyone stampeded out and that family members trampled one another. In the family, there is no Prisoner’s Dilemma because each is confident that the others can be counted on.” And yet, he suggests shortly afterward, “The trust engendered by personal relations presents, by its very existence, enhanced opportunity for malfeasance. In personal relations it is common knowledge that ‘you always hurt the one you love’; that person’s trust in you results in a position far more vulnerable than that of a stranger …” The *circumstances* under which such betrayals occur are left open, however, and no general reason is given for when to expect close ties to abstain from opportunism and when to embrace it.
idea that the “stronger the ties are, the more the motives are expected to be altruistic and expressive” (717). This seems to me to be a mistake. In Chan’s framework, trust, affection, obligation and so on take on their usual valences, ranging from affective fuzziness to instrumental coldness, as we move from strong ties to weak ones. But a central lesson from Zelizer’s work is that a conventional spectrum of action-orientation in exchange from the affective to the instrumental is not empirically accurate. In the end, the actions of the sellers are not satisfactorily explained. The explanatory role of culture reverts to the level of generalized morality, and the anomaly is downplayed:

The period of relying on reflexive trust for transactions did not last long. Soon after the public learned that life insurance carried the inherent risk that the money they paid might not be returned if no misfortunes happened to them, they were much less interested in this new commodity. The “unknown commodity” turned out to be an “unwanted commodity.”

The trouble is that it should not have happened at all, and that this phase in the development of the market ended because of a public relations miscalculation.

The case of AIG in China should also give pause to complacent invocations of “relational work”. In particular, Chan’s analysis challenges the widespread tendency to see relational work as somehow an intrinsically positive sort of activity, something that people do in order to smooth out or soften the logic of the market. In their interactions with close relatives and friends, the sales agents fluidly and dynamically negotiated meanings and drew on strong cultural tropes. But this Goffmanian expertise it was deployed in the service of a very self-interested goal. They wanted their forty percent.⁶ This is not the motivation typically presented as lying behind practices of “relational work”.

⁶ Chan denies this interpretation. “I maintain”, she says, “that the binding force of the cultural rules was working; otherwise, the agents would not have had ‘psychological barriers’ to selling to their strong ties initially; nor would they have avoided approaching their close ties once the commissions were made public. … The agents’ active and instant withdrawal was driven less by economic calculation than by their concern about the meanings of their behaviors in the eyes of their strong ties” (Chan, 2009, p. 735). But, given the context of the rest of the article, this seems to concede that the sellers knew that what they were doing was wrong, that they stopped immediately once they were found out, and that when they made their sales pitch they were still able to activate these tropes of trust and respect, psychological barriers notwithstanding. They did the relational work, in other words, in the teeth of their own standards of behavior.
EXTENDING RELATIONAL WORK

Considered in contrast to some standard views in economics, Granovetter's approach emphasized the importance of social structure. Foregrounding “embeddedness” meant arguing that successful exchanges often required social relations with more depth or concreteness than were available to thinner theoretical conceptions of rational agents and their interests. As with the sauce on your steak, so with the concepts in your theory: rich and substantial is better than thin and watery. Within economic sociology, arguments for “relational work” contrast themselves with more structural views in just the same way. This time, however, it is the cultural side that is substantial and the structural side that is thin. This is a nested contrast of the sort Abbott (2000) describes in his analysis of how basic disciplinary dichotomies reproduce themselves over and over as move through time or unfold within fields and subfields.

Are we fated to fractally re-enact the debates of our forebears? Perhaps the contrast between embeddedness and relational work might better be thought of as one of Structure vs Process rather than Structure vs Culture. Even here, the gap between the terms might not seem so wide had embeddedness approaches (and network analysis generally) not routinely emphasized an imagery of “concrete” social relations in the 1970s and 1980s. This gave the strong impression that the network program saw culture as destined either for direct reduction to patterns of “real” social relations, or for explanatory elimination altogether along with “generalized morality.”7 Zelizer, on the other hand, reacted against the imagery of “concrete” social ties by arguing that in her view the social ties that matter “are not the thin, flat relations of network analysis but the rich relations of ethnography” (Zelizer, 2011, p. 390). It has taken some time for network analysis to come around to a stronger conception of culture. The prospect of reducing social action to a pure theory of structure has by now faded away, even as the scope and volume of network analysis has expanded enormously. The shift in tone and content between White (1992) and White (2008) is instructive here. Meanwhile, on the cultural side, the idea that social structure should be subordinated to culture in principle, as a matter of explanatory priority and disciplinary identity, now seems like an atavistic throwback to conceptions of sociology that Granovetter, Zelizer, and others have been trying to get beyond for decades.

7 It’s worth remembering, however, that the now-dominant, practice-based view of culture—with its favored imagery of schematic repertoires, versatile tool-kits, and a context-specific senses for action—was also a reaction against the Parsonian picture of “generalized morality” [swidler86culturaction]. In fact, Granovetter noted—arguing against a Marxist line on culture-as-ideology—that “more sophisticated … analyses of cultural influences” show that “culture is not a once-and-for-all influence but an ongoing process, continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction. It not only shapes its members but is also shaped by them, in part for their own strategic reasons” (Granovetter, 1985, p. 486). But that is as far as this line of thought goes in that article.
Instead, the emphasis on the relational and systematic aspects of meaningful social ties has become more noticeable over the same period, led by Zelizer’s own scholarship. Much of the work in this area focuses on two problems: the initial effort to institute or define a viable exchange relation; and the ongoing effort between linked parties to keep that relationship going one way or another. What has become increasingly clear is the need for a theory of how conflict or disagreement over these matters arises, up to and including the question of the viability of the exchange relation itself, along with an framework for understanding how this conflict gets resolved or not by those involved.

Those interested in advancing an agenda for relational work should think about what such an account would look like. Its first phase examined how relations are instituted and maintained. At the very beginning—in Zelizer (1989), for example—the focus was on just showing that “thick” social relations and various kinds of money really did mix together in many settings, as an observable matter of fact. In following up on this insight, a subsequent wave of researchers examined cases where there were seemingly strong or irreconcilable antinomies between money and gifts, or money and love, or money and domesticity, or money and just about anything that matters to people apart from money. They set about showing these divisions were managed by people in some kind of unexpectedly effective way.

This work often also connected organizational and institutional structure to the cultural part of the analysis. For instance, the personally meaningful “relational work” found in moralized exchanges may originate with and be sustained by some organization with an interest in seeing the exchange happen successfully. Blood banks and organ procurement organizations, for example, created a detailed cultural account of blood and organ donation as a kind of morally worthwhile gift. The social meaning of the exchange—specifically, its conceptualization as a gift—mattered for the success of the exchange, even though blood and organ donors do not typically meet the recipients of their generosity. The gift framing also mattered despite the fact that the donor-recipient relation may be one-to-many, or even when money changes hands and is accounted for as “reimbursement” or insurance payments rather than income and profits (Healy, 2006).

In a similar way, agencies brokering egg and sperm donations manage their exchanges in ways that involve “relational work”. They encourage participants to think about the exchange in highly moralized terms, with the moral content strongly inflected by prevailing notions of gender, which themselves have a strong normative component (Almeling, 2007, 2011). Or again, the emergence of a secondary market in life insurance policies gets interpreted differently depending on the institutional location of actors, and the history of their association with similar products (Quinn, 2008). Sometimes it seems repellant, at other times praiseworthy. Zelizer’s own research has emphasized these aspects, too. The Purchase of Intimacy (Zelizer, 2005) is built around studies of open interpersonal conflict carried on not by some informal means, but in the
courtroom.

These organizational and institutional aspects of a broadly Zelizerian economic sociology are sometimes overlooked or misread. These exchanges are characterized in purely cultural terms as (a) concerned principally with “social meaning”, but not more structural aspects of exchange, and (b) mostly about exchanges that are somewhat distant from the “real” economy, whether intimate, domestic, or exotic. This is an error for familiar reasons. These exchanges are of course quite real. Often they are economically vital, even if they are not directly measured in official statistics (Folbre, 2002). Their apparent of exoticism is a matter of perspective rather than a fixed fact (Wherry, 2008). And more conventional economic transactions are in no way immune to a Zelizerian reading (Bandelj, 2007).

Restricting one's view of relational work in this way is a mistake for two other important reasons. First, over the past thirty years there have been changes in the formal, informal and quasi-formal provision of intimate, personal, and domestic labor and services of all kinds (Hochschild, 2003). Shifts in the volume and structure of “care work” in all its forms—whether those being cared for are children, the sick, able-bodied adults, or the elderly—is directly connected to large-scale changes in the health-care system, the labor market, and the welfare state. (See, e.g., Duffy (2011), Glenn (2010), and Macdonald (2011) for work on these questions.) It is not possible to understand what is happening in this sphere without a good theory of how relational practices connect with official classifications and institutions within the labor market, and more generally with social processes connecting kinds of people to kinds of work. Relational practices, in short, require a theory of social power. There is a great potential for a relational economic sociology to connect with research in this area. Some of this is already happening. Here I want to emphasize that this is not just a matter of researchers pushing into some new field of study, but also a consequence of how economic life itself—the “real” economy—has changed since the birth of the New Economic Sociology in the 1980s.

Second, and also less well-recognized than it should be, is the relevance of macro-level changes in the political economy of capitalism (as distinct from shifts in the occupational structure and the labor market), particularly financialization and all that it has brought with it (Krippner, 2011). The proliferation of insurance, credit, and risk management markets of all kinds over the past two or three decades makes Zelizer seem unexpectedly prescient in her decision to study life insurance as a case of the construction of a moralized market. In her work on insurance (Zelizer, 1979), and also the changing social value of children (Zelizer, 1985), Zelizer examines connections between large shifts in the social structure (the urbanization and industrialization of America), conceptions of morality and value, and the effort to institutionalize new kinds of commodities. The growth of the life insurance market was accompanied by extensive efforts to assert its moral basis: “Death yielded to the capitalist ethos—but
not without compelling the latter to disguise its materialist mission in spiritual garb” (Zelizer, 2011, p. 32).

Are there parallel cultural consequences of financialization? We don’t yet know. One possibility is that in the mortgage market, the moral commitment to honor one’s debts—the “solemn obligation” to make the monthly payment—has been undermined quite radically. The prospect that homeowners might begin treating their main asset in the same rational terms that corporations treat their property, or rational investors treat their stock, has been enough to prompt a certain amount of panic in some quarters, and schadenfreude in others (Lowenstein, 2010). The effects of the financial crisis on moralized conceptions of debt and credit remain more or less unexplored. The shock of the 2008 crisis is one source of pressure on norms about debt, but the long-term shift towards a financialized orientation to assets is another. This is not to say that norms about credit and debt in the United States have declined from some golden age of fiscal responsibility—see, e.g., Calder (1999); Cohen (2003)]. But disagreement and conflict in this area—line-drawing, rule-making, and labeling about good debts and bad, virtuous loans and bad credit, solemn obligations versus empty promises—has the same elements as the life insurance case, and is open to the same kind of analysis. Perhaps the neoliberal shift has, as a consequence of its own success, ended up destroying the market’s Durkheimian backstop. Perhaps not. But from London’s summer riots of 2011 to the political crisis in Greece, to the rise and fall of the Occupy movement, it is not hard to see connections between the political economy of capitalism and the moral order of market society. There are many questions here that relational economic sociology should be trying to answer.

SELF-INTEREST AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

As even the dogs in the street can tell you by now, in The Wealth of Nations Adam Smith argues that the division of labor has advanced principally because of “a certain propensity in human nature … to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” (Smith, 2000, p. 11). He goes on say that he will not, at this time, inquire whether this propensity is “one of those original principles in human nature of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech”. A paragraph or two later Smith says, in another famous turn of phrase, that “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest … [We] never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.” From there, the nickel-version of Smith’s relationship to modern economics quickly carries us on (with some risk of whiplash) to incentives, price-coordinating markets, and the wholly self-regarding ways of homo economicus.
But Smith, as you are also probably aware, was a much more interesting thinker than that. Although he says we talk to the butcher and brewer only of their advantages rather than ours, we still talk to them. In his *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, unlike in *The Wealth of Nations* Smith does take a moment to ask where people’s propensity to exchange comes from. His answer is surprising:

If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which this disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the natural inclination every one has to persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest. Men always endeavour to persuade others to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no consequence to them. … in this manner every one is practising oratory on others thro’ the whole of his life. (Smith, 1982)

An offer of money to buy something, Smith is saying, is a kind of conversational gambit—in doing so I am making a civil effort to persuade you that something is in your interest, and this effort of mine is a species of the human impulse to persuade others of things generally. Money, in short, is a social relation. Many a modern discussion of Smith takes self-interest, or concern for oneself, and sets it against altruism, or concern for others. What Smith in fact does is take self-interest and pair it with sociability, in order to highlight a fundamental complementarity. The former is expressed by way of the latter. To offer money for something is to do a little relational, conversational work.

I do not want to lean too heavily on this genteel snippet of the Scottish Enlightenment. But the point that self-interest and sociability are not necessarily opposed to one another is worth bearing in mind. The embeddedness approach emerged out of an argument focused on the *problem of order*, specifically, the role of local social relations in controlling malfeasance or cheating through the generation of mutual obligations and trust. It is a Hobbesian picture. The imagery of embeddedness is that of suspension and constraint. People are pinned down by social ties. This is what stops them from being too selfish. What has attracted economic sociologists to the “relational work” approach, in reaction to this, is the sense that it offers people a bit more leeway to act, a little more room for them to develop identities and cultivate “rich” or “meaningful” social relations, not just arrangements that might prevent your friends and relations from cheating you.

Yet, although it may not seem like on the surface, the concept of relational work immediately puts individuals’ agency, strategies, and thus their self-interest back at the center of the analysis. The Zelizerian view certainly rejects the idea that social life is nothing but self-interested action, narrowly construed. Yes, social relations are meaningful, identities are multi-faceted, exchange is moralized, and so on. But just
consider the implication of Zelizer’s oft-quoted line that people are “smarter than money”. What this means, in practice, is that they struggle with one another about how to categorize the relationships they are in. They seek to link forms of payment to bundles of obligations and rights, which secure resources for them. They establish circuits of exchange to mobilize and protect these resources. They constantly push and pull at what the relationship they are in is about, and who has what obligations. In all of this they “incessantly negotiate the precise matching of meaning, media, and transactions” (Zelizer, 2011, p. 75). They negotiate. Zelizer uses the term repeatedly and quite deliberately. Discussions of her work often fail to follow up on the point that negotiation is a thing people do when they want different things.

People create, mark, and maintain meaningful exchange relationships in order to do something, at least as best as they can under the circumstances. Students of “relational work” should not rest content with demonstrations that people “make exchanges meaningful” in some bland sense. Zelizer’s relational view does not say, “Take some uncomfortable or taboo exchange; add ‘meaning’; lie down and wait for your analytical tension to resolve; then marvel at richness of economic life for the rest of the evening”. Her vision is much more challenging than that. It encompasses exchanges where there is conflict about who gets to define a tie, where one party has the means to make the terms of relationship stick, where social meanings are a vehicle for power. Now that its foundations have been laid, scholars interested in relational work should examine how people deal with these awkward relations.

REFERENCES


