Forging the Frontiers between State, Church, and Family: Religious Cleavages and the Origins of Early Childhood Education and Care Policies in France, Sweden, and Germany

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European states differ tremendously in the extent to which their national education systems administer preschool programs, and whether or not these services can serve as day care for working parents. This article traces contemporary policy differences in three countries—France, Sweden, and Germany—to the effects of nineteenth-century conflicts between religious and secular forces over education. Intense, clerical-ant clerical conflict in France led to the incorporation of preschools into the national education system. In Sweden and Germany, the more accommodating relationship between church and state assured that no such incorporation took place. These decisions had lasting consequences for the nature and extensiveness of child care services for preschool-aged children.

In recent years, child care has emerged as an important issue in both public policy and scholarly analysis of the welfare state. Researchers and advocates have shown that early childhood education and care programs are beneficial for child development, particularly for disadvantaged children. Such programs can also help fight poverty; cross-national studies have shown that solo mothers are financially better off in nations that promote mothers’ employment through public day care and other forms of employment support. In addition, feminist activists and

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researchers have long pointed to the availability of day care services as essential to women’s equality. By enabling mothers to remain in the labor force, public day care should bolster their capacity to maintain autonomous households—one criterion by which feminist analysts judge the welfare state.

Scholars have begun to look at child care as a hitherto neglected area of the welfare state that sheds light on the gendered assumptions underpinning much social policy. Traditionally, comparative welfare state research took the male worker as the unit of analysis in assessing the effects of welfare states. In recent years, a growing body of feminist research has shown how welfare states shape gender relations and the division of labor in the workplace and home. The extensiveness of public child care and programs such as paid parental leave have been used by some analysts to gauge the gendered effects of social policy. Extensive public child care provision indicates support for women’s employment, while opposition to public day care may signal a desire to maintain traditional family arrangements. Public policies that promote the compatibility of childbearing and paid work also have been linked to both higher fertility rates and lower unemployment, the latter effects coming through the expansion of social services employment in the public sector.

The forces driving the vast differences between countries in their child care systems are less well understood. In the contemporary literature on the welfare state in Western Europe, scholars have assumed that differences in child care provision can be explained by the strength of leftist versus conservative political parties. Yet, a closer look at child care provision in Western Europe reveals a number of puzzles (see Table 1). In Scandinavia, where Social Democratic parties have been the predominant political forces, there is generally a high degree of public provision, although Finland and Norway offer markedly less public day care than their neighbors. Yet, there is considerable diversity among the continental European countries, usually called “Christian democratic” or “conservative” welfare states (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands). Scholars label these welfare states “conservative” because their social policies tend to uphold traditional class, status, occupational, and gender relations. Thus, one would expect minimal public day care, and that policies would encourage mothers to be full-time caregivers. However, France, Belgium, and Italy all offer universal, or nearly universal, preschool for children age three to six, exceeding the generosity of Scandinavian welfare states. As France and Belgium allow children to enter preschool at the age of two-and-a-half, the education system in both countries partially accounts for the high percentages of children under the age of three in public child care. In France, for example, 35 percent of two-year-olds attend publicly run or publicly funded preschools.

France, Belgium, and Italy also are unique in that these programs are part of the education system, yet services are available for a full school day. In Scandinavia, welfare or social services departments administer child care and they tailor these...
programs to the needs of working parents. In most other countries, child care for children aged three to six is part of the education system, but often are only part-day or part-week programs, oriented around education instead of parents’ work schedules. In France, Belgium, and Italy, child care for three-to-six-year-olds consists of free, universally available preschools that are part of national education systems, yet are open for a full school day (see Table 2). While not always perfectly matching the schedules of working parents, these programs do cover much of the day, and a number of cities have added after-school programs that round out a full work day. In essence, these programs fuse care taking and education functions in a set of broadly available, and highly popular, programs.

Analysts have failed to understand or interpret these programs, in part because students of the welfare state generally neglect education systems and their impact on social welfare. In addition, the complexity of early childhood education and care systems makes it difficult to interpret the nature and extensiveness of these programs. While day care for children below the “educable” age of three nearly always consists of care-taking services for working parents, children between the ages of three and six (or the mandatory school age) are often in more pedagogically oriented programs, like kindergartens. Thus, for preschool-aged children,
countries usually offer a mix of education and care-taking programs, with some countries leaning toward full-day provision of educational and/or care services, while other states have preferred to create part-day programs (see Tables 1 and 2). Faced with this complexity, some scholars have misunderstood the nature of preschool programs and assumed that these services are strictly educational and cannot be a form of day care.12

Given the often central role of education ministries in the development and administration of child care for preschool-aged children, politics surrounding the development of these services differ from politics of other, more conventional features of the welfare state. This article explains differences in child care services for preschool-aged children by examining the historical origins and development of education programs for young children in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries—a crucial period for defining the outlines of education systems in Western Europe.13 This piece examines three countries that pursued divergent paths in early childhood education in that period: France, Sweden, and Germany. These countries were selected because they are representative of three different types of service provision (see Table 3). As noted earlier, France resembles Belgium and Italy in its universal provision through the education system for children aged three-to-six. Germany is like the Netherlands and Austria in the preference for part-day preschool programs. And Sweden looks like the other Scandinavian countries in the lack of early education programs until recent decades, and the development of contemporary programs through the social services sector. As a result, the findings for these three particular cases should shed light on patterns of child care provision in a larger set of European countries.14
In France, preschools have been part of the national education system since the late nineteenth century and have performed both care-taking and pedagogical functions. Today, these programs form the backbone of an internationally renowned system of early childhood education and care. In Germany, preschools never became part of the national education system and have remained largely part-day or part-week services, at least in the länder of the former West Germany. Until the late 1960s, Sweden lagged behind most other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) states in providing any early education or day care programs. When the Swedes began creating child care centers in the 1960s and 1970s, they were free to do so as part of the social services sector, specifically to meet labor market objectives. The expansion of public day care in Sweden since 1970 will not be covered in detail; rather, this article will concentrate on why the Swedes were so late in developing any preschool or day care services, and why the programs that they created took the form that they did.

These patterns can be explained by the nature of religious conflicts in these societies at the time when mass education was being developed. The founding of national education systems in the mid- to late-nineteenth century was a “critical juncture” for early childhood education policy. Boundaries between church, state, and the family were established during this period, and they laid out responsibilities for the care and socialization of young children. In France, the incorporation of early childhood education programs into the national education system legitimized these programs and grounded them in a powerful national bureaucracy. It also created a sector of unionized teachers that would strongly advocate these programs. All of these features contributed to the expansion and universalization of these programs in the twentieth century. In addition, developing early education programs as part of the mass education system ensured that these services would be oriented around the needs of the working class—the target population for public education projects. As a result, French preschools fused both educational and care-taking functions—a quality that has endured to the present day. The unintended consequence was to create programs that would later become a form of universal day care, and a major source of support to working mothers.

In Germany, early childhood education services were never incorporated into the national education system, but left to the voluntary sector. As programs oriented around the interests of the middle class, most preschools evolved as part-day programs with a strong pedagogic orientation. The availability of these services has increased since the 1970s in West Germany, but they have remained part-day programs. In Sweden, the absence of either model of public day care left a void to be filled by public policy in the 1960s. When the state began massive investments in day care, it faced little opposition from entrenched educational interests and was free to create programs through the social services sector. Unconstrained by existing approaches to early childhood education, the Swedes created day care services to support high levels of female employment. Even so,
Sweden has yet to match France’s universal provision of services for preschool-aged children.

Whether states incorporated preschool services into their national education programs in the nineteenth century was determined by the strength of anticlericalism in disputes over who would control the education system. In France, fierce clerical-anticlerical battles were waged on the terrain of education, and early childhood education became enmeshed in these competitive struggles. As Catholics and secular Republicans sparred over who would shape the socialization of the nation’s children, the boundaries between public and private, state and family, were redrawn. The socialization of very young children—between the ages of three and six—became part of national education policy. By contrast, in both Germany and Scandinavia, churches maintained their role in the education system as agents of the state. This was especially the case in Scandinavia, where church and state essentially had been united since the Reformation. The role of the National Lutheran church in education was thus guaranteed, and the clergy put their energies into a cooperative effort to further the state schools rather than a competition to secure greater numbers of children in a private system. In the nineteenth century and through much of the twentieth, the socialization and care of young children continued to be viewed as a family responsibility.

The German case is complicated by periods of strong religious conflict that spurred political mobilization around religion. However, the challenge by secularists to church control of the education system ultimately petered out, owing to the weakness of political liberalism. Churches and their related voluntary associations maintained their role in administering the education system, which removed the kinds of competitive conflicts that might have brought younger and younger children into the spotlight as targets of socialization. The evolution of early childhood education in Germany would mirror that of many other countries—as purely educational services focused on the preferences and needs of the middle class.²⁰

These findings have a number of implications. First, this article uncovers the historical roots of public policies that have the potential to remake gender relations by promoting women’s work outside the home. As noted earlier, numerous studies have revealed that the availability of affordable child care services increases the likelihood of mothers’ employment.²¹ Working outside the home is one way to increase women’s autonomy by offering the possibility of “exit” from, and thus “voice” within, personal relationships.²² Yet, such effects can result from policies that are in no way driven by feminist goals. Even though the French early education system was not devised to offer day care for working parents, its unintended long-term effect would be to support mothers’ employment. French mothers remain in the labor force at high percentages, and women’s part-time work is less common than in most other European countries (see Table 4).²³

This article also addresses the much neglected domain of public policies for children and probes the politics surrounding such policies. Debates over early childhood education and care often revolve around the apportionment of respon-
sibility between states, families, and the voluntary sector (including churches) for the socialization of young children. As a result, public policies for children often tap deeply-held sentiments about the appropriate relationship between the state and the family. Such questions were often as hotly contested in late nineteenth century Europe as they have been in more recent debates in the United States over school vouchers, prayer in school, or the acceptability of day care.

As will be shown later, efforts to explain child care policies by socioeconomic variables or state structures founder on their lack of attention to the ideological dimension of this public policy area. Cultural explanations may capture the color and intensity of such sentiments, but fail to address either the origins of ideological perspectives, or the mechanisms through which these views have influence. The approach taken in this piece traces ideologies concerning the family to cleavages around religion in Western Europe. Such divisions shaped the kinds of issues that came on the political agenda, the way in which these questions would be debated, and the decisions ultimately made—in this case, over the respective roles that churches, states, and families would play in the lives of young children. Identifying the political strength of competing ideological perspectives during a crucial period of policy formation illuminates the historic roots of contemporary approaches to public child care.

This article will first review a number of competing explanations for the nature of child care provision in Western Europe and then detail the author’s own explanation. The remaining sections will explore the level of support for these alternatives by tracing the ways in which religious conflicts shaped the development of early childhood education services in France, Sweden, and Germany.

### ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

There are a number of potential explanations that could account for differences in early childhood education systems. One approach might depict these programs as a response by states and charitable organizations to industrialization and rising

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Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>With One Child under Six</th>
<th>With Two Children, Youngest under Six</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union average (12)</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data only for old West German länder.*

rates of women’s labor force participation. Industrialization and urbanization in the nineteenth century led to a bifurcation between the workplace and home. As women were drawn into the labor force, they often left children unattended or brought them to factories where they risked injury or death. In response, charitable groups in most Western countries began creating nurseries to care for these children, often with local government support. Over the course of the nineteenth century, national governments began to supervise, fund, and/or control these programs.

While these factors form the backdrop for the growth of what were known as “infant schools” and “day nurseries” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they fail to explain diverging patterns of development in France, Germany, and Sweden (see Tables 5 and 6). While there are differences between rates of women’s labor force participation in these three countries, they are not great enough to account for variations in early childhood education policies. For example, in France, rates of women’s labor force activity are slightly higher than in Germany and Sweden in the period between 1860 and 1910. But the small differences cannot account for the great variation in percentages of children in preschools in that period. As for industrialization, Sweden certainly was a highly agrarian society in the 1880s (see Table 7). From that point on, however, the percentages of women working in the agricultural sector drops markedly, while the percentages working in industry rapidly increase. However, this was met by no corresponding increase in the availability of public child care and early education programs. Despite industrialization throughout the interwar period, in fact, there was no substantial government commitment to day care or early childhood education until the 1960s. In short, there is no linear relationship between labor market structures and the development of preschool education.

Another alternative explanation relies on culture. Public policies may reflect distinct cultural values in each society that drive the choices of political elites and the preferences of the general public. Thus, prevailing sentiments as to the appropriateness of drawing children out of the family at an early age may explain the availability or absence of preschools. For example, Ralf Dahrendorf has argued that the “inward orientation” of Germans and the prevalence of “private over public virtues” privilege the family over schools and other public domains. As he wrote in the mid-1960s,

There is no preschool system of any kind in Germany; indeed, schooling at the age of four—with a playful kind of school, to be sure—appears to German parents, teachers, and politicians as a monstrous infraction of the rights of the family.

Such accounts have difficulties accounting for the marked changes that often occur in policy approaches. For example, East and West Germany developed radically different approaches to child policy during the cold war, with East Germany creating universal public day care and preschools while West German provision
remained low and ill suited to the working parent. This could hardly be a manifestation of suddenly diverging cultural values, but reflected the ideological underpinning of two vastly different regime types. In addition, purely cultural explanations of public policies are generally weak in showing how culture translates into public policy. Finally, such approaches often leave open the question

Table 5
Children in Preschools, 1860-1970, as Percentage of Children in Eligible Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>50.5 (1953-4)</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>9.5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>21.8a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: Percentages are estimates that are calculated based on the number of children between the ages of three and six in each country. Given that many children attended preschools sporadically, and that children younger than three and older than six sometimes were in these programs, the figures are imperfect estimates. Note that the figures for France before 1940 probably underestimate the numbers of children in preelementary education due to the lack of data on forms of preschool education other than the classic école maternelle.

Table 6
Women’s Labor Force Activity, as Percentage of Total Female Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>25 (1856)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>33 (1896)</td>
<td>25 (1895)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>42 (1921)</td>
<td>35 (1925)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>28 (1967)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7
Women Working in Each Sector, as Percentage of Total Women Working

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>67</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where different cultural orientations come from. If German public policy reflects the widespread belief that young children belong at home with their mothers, what explains the strength and persistence of these views?

Many of the classic accounts of the development of social insurance and other welfare state programs have emphasized class politics—either the mobilization of the working class, or the growing interest of the middle class in redistributive social policy. This forms a third alternative explanation—that variations in early childhood education policies reflect differences in the political strength of unions and working class parties. The French case clearly contradicts this thesis, as unionization rates in France are some of the lowest of any OECD country, and socialist parties have historically lacked the kind of political hegemony achieved by the Scandinavian social democratic parties. More generally, to the extent that early childhood programs are part of the education system, the kinds of explanations that best account for the development of these programs differ from those employed in conventional studies of the welfare state. As will be shown below, the development of national education systems was often less tied to the class politics that shaped the founding of social insurance systems than it was to disputes over the respective roles of church and state in the administration and staffing of schools.

A fourth approach would explain public policies according to the nature of state power, processes of nation-state building, and/or the structure of political institutions. Comparative studies of education systems have related the development of public schools to the construction of the modern nation-state. States created secondary school systems to produce a trained administrative, military, and scientific elite, and used mass education to forge a unified, national culture. In this view, centralized, bureaucratic states produced more extensive public education services, especially where these states faced military conflicts or underwent major internal transformations. More generally, scholars have argued that centralized states should, in general, spend more on public welfare and be more efficacious in implementing public policy.

These approaches are weak in accounting for cross-national variations in the development of public education and fail in particular to explain the structure of education systems, such as whether schools are open to the youngest educable segment of the population. Extensive mass education developed in both highly bureaucratic and less bureaucratic states. In the United States, the paragon of the weakly bureaucratic and decentralized polity, the development of mass education outstripped the efforts of the centralized European states. In addition, all three of the states studied here—France, Prussia, and Sweden—had a history of bureaucratic absolutism and developed centralized education systems. Still, the three states differed markedly in their willingness to develop preschool programs as part of their education systems. More generally, bureaucratic autonomy and state centralization cannot predict the direction of public policies. A state might use its
autonomy vis-à-vis social forces to ignore demands for early childhood education, but it could also use this power to implement such programs over cries of opposition. Institutional structures alone cannot account for the ideological content of public policy.

On the other hand, nation building clearly was one of the imperatives that drove the development of education in all three countries, as most Western European countries developed mass education systems in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. We can best appreciate this factor in light of the notion of “critical junctures” for the development of public policies. The construction of national education systems put the issue of who would socialize and care for younger children on the political agenda. Thus, nation building helped open a window of opportunity for remaking the traditional lines of demarcation between states, families, and churches. Yet, nations varied markedly in where they decided to draw the line between public and private, with some assigning responsibility for the early care and socialization of young children to the state, and others leaving such matters up to churches, voluntary associations, and families.

These differences were the product of conflicts over religion that played out on the contested terrain of education. The construction or consolidation of nation-states in the nineteenth century brought many national governments into direct conflict with their main competitor for the hearts and minds of the people: the church. The conflict was often fiercest in the area of education, which had been the exclusive domain of churches, Catholic and Protestant alike, for many centuries. In many Protestant countries, the national church became a partner of the state in the implementation of education policy, rather than a competitor. In Catholic countries, by contrast, battles raged over who would control education. Lipset and Rokkan aptly characterized the situation in their classic work on political cleavages in Europe:

The development of compulsory education under centralized secular control for all children of the nation came into direct conflict with the established rights of the religious pouvoirs intermédiaires and triggered waves of mass mobilization into nationwide parties of protest. To the radicals and liberals inspired by the French Revolution, the introduction of compulsory education was only one among several measures in a systematic effort to create direct links of influence and control between the nation-state and the individual citizen, but their attempt to penetrate directly to the children without consulting the parents and their spiritual authorities aroused widespread opposition and bitter fights.34

Conflicts over schools were a source of political conflict for at least 100 years and produced lines of political cleavage that would endure well into the twentieth century.

The presence, or absence, of conflict and competition over education affected whether countries incorporated early childhood education programs into national education systems. In France, where conflicts were fierce between clericals and anticlericals, the scramble over education led both sides to reach down into youn-
ger segments of the population. Child minding was plucked away from its charitable patrons and incorporated into education systems, first as part of the congregations’ efforts to fortify church-based schools, and then as the foundation of a public system of education. The remapping of boundaries between state, church, and family began in the late nineteenth century in France, and was consolidated in the 1960s and 1970s as full-day preschool became universally available.

The partnership of the Lutheran churches and the Nordic states precluded the development of a competing sector of nonstate schools. The Lutheran church remained the national church in Sweden until very recently and maintained its role in administering the education system until the 1950s. One consequence was the failure to develop early childhood education services until the late 1960s. Without the kinds of conflicts and political cleavages found in France, there was little competition over who would be responsible for socializing the nation’s children, and the latter task was left to families themselves. Until the 1960s, the boundaries between family and state concerning the education of young children remained unaltered. The same ultimately was accomplished in Prussia and Germany, albeit following considerably more turmoil related to the presence of an important Catholic minority hoping to create its own privately run schools. Yet, the state succeeded in blocking the creation of a nonstate school sector by incorporating the clergy into the administration of the education system. Clerical-anticlerical conflict eroded as a line of cleavage, especially as political liberalism was too weak to impose a system of national, secular schools.

THE CATHOLIC-ANTICLERICAL DIVIDE AND EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION IN FRANCE

The French preschool system has been universal since the late 1970s, but its origins lie in nineteenth-century conflicts between Catholics and secularist Republicans over who would control children’s education. The late nineteenth century was a critical moment for the development of the earliest public policies for the education of young children, when the outlines of the national education system were determined. Political conflicts between Catholics and secularists in that era were decisive both in spurring the creation of early childhood education services through a competitive struggle and then in securing a place for these programs in the national education system. Incorporated into an ambitious education bureaucracy that was imbued with a civilizing and nation-building mission, the French preschools would have a secure future and strong institutional base. In addition, because these programs were oriented around working class families—the target population of the mass education system—the programs combined both care-taking and educational functions that benefited low-income mothers who worked outside the home. The programs were institutionalized in a form that would later make them an important form of day care for a broad base of the population.
Nineteenth-century France is often portrayed as two worlds, one resolutely monarchist, proclerical, and reactionary, and the other just as determinedly revolutionary, anticlerical, and republican. There are numerous ways in which both sides were in fact much closer in habit and outlook than political rhetoric might lead one to suspect. Nonetheless, observers of the day perceived an inherent dualism in the political and social world around them, one that would permanently divide clericalists and monarchists from liberals and republicans. “Christian or republican, that is the dilemma,” said Proudhon. Such perceptions were enough to propel continuous political conflict, despite the nuances of everyday life.

The disputes centered on the respective roles of Church and state in the lives of the French people. Clericalism, and anticlericalism, became the source of deep and enduring cleavages in political and social life. While anticlericalism’s intellectual roots extend deep into the Enlightenment, it was first and foremost a political phenomena, a power struggle between Catholics and anticlericalists over who would hold sway over the state, the community, and the family. Since the French Revolution, the Church’s association with and defense of the monarchy and hereditary privilege earned it the lasting enmity of the revolutionaries and their political descendants. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Catholic Church became associated with political movements to restore the monarchy, and with the reactionary regimes of the Restoration (1815-1830) and the Second Empire (1851-1870). As ultra-Montanist views spread among the clergy, many churchmen and women shifted their efforts from conquest of the state toward a renewed social role and influence over the lives of individuals.

In the conflict between Catholics and secularists over who would shape the loyalties and values of the citizenry, education became the privileged terrain of dispute. Education had long been the exclusive prerogative of churches in France, as in all of Europe, and the French Revolution brought attacks on all sites of religious influence. The revolutionaries championed the ideal of secularized public education, and it was a notion that lived on in the minds of generations of republicans, liberals, and leftists. Church-run education touched many chords that irked anticlericalists about the influence of the clergy in state and society: the local clergy had influence over the careers and livelihood of secular instructors, who were dependent on clergy-dominated educational councils; girls were disproportionately educated and influenced by the Church, which could lead them to defy their republican husbands or fathers; Catholic ideas predominated over rationalist, scientific ones in shaping the worldviews of French citizens; ultra-Montanists preached that loyalty should be to the Pope first, and not the state. Perhaps most important, republicans viewed the development of two rival education systems as a threat to national unity.

The issue of who would shape the socialization of very young children became enmeshed in these larger disputes over education. During the ancien régime and
the first decades after the French Revolution, the care and education of children under the primary school age was relegated entirely to domain of the family. As Talleyrand said before the Constituent Assembly during the Revolution, “until the age of six or seven, public instruction should hardly reach the young child: its faculties are too weak, too little developed[...] Until then, the child must be fed, cared for, strengthened, and made happy; this is the obligation of mothers.” In reality, working class families often had no choice but to send their children any place where they could be looked after while both parents worked. While officially disapproving, state and local authorities assumed that such decisions were private matters and they turned a blind eye to these activities.

Well-to-do women and men in the 1820s and 1830s created the first infant schools, known as *salles d’asile*, in response to the needs of poor parents for a place to leave their children during the day. The primary purpose of the *salles d’asile* was to look after poor children while their parents were working. In contrast to the other child care arrangements of the day, however, the *dames patronnesses* that ran the programs aspired to provide rudimentary education for their charges as well. This brought their efforts to the attention of the Ministry of Public Instruction, which was particularly jealous of its prerogatives in the field of education during this period of anticlerical reaction. To many in the educational bureaucracy, the infant schools’ charitable administration was too closely linked to that of the *hospices*, which it associated with clericalism and demeaning forms of private charity. The Ministry asserted its control over the schools and made them eligible to receive funds from communes. As a concession to the politically well-connected *patronnesses* of the schools, the Ministry left the administration of these schools in the hands of their bourgeois patrons.

Such a stance was typical of French school authorities, as financial means failed to match ambitions. The persistent shortage of teachers, which resulted largely from the low pay and precarious conditions of the teaching profession, pushed several French regimes to rely on the congregations for teachers. The religious orders often were the only educated teaching corps available. In the first half of the nineteenth century, religious congregations flourished as a way to further the Church’s charitable activities. Their members were involved in religious instruction, education, and nursing, and they often taught in public schools and were on the public payroll. During the Second Empire, there was a tremendous expansion of Catholic secondary, primary, and pre-primary education. Whereas 29 percent of primary school children were taught in Catholic schools in 1850, that number reached 44 percent by 1876. The greatest gains were in public schools, but there was also a trend toward dominance of the private school sector by the Church.

While the regime in power looked favorably on the role of congregations in education as part of its efforts to woo the Catholic hierarchy, relations between clergy, local notables, and secular teachers often were less tranquil at the local
level. In some areas, clergy and local notables worked together to create and maintain schools. In others, state-trained instituteurs clashed with the clergy over local schools. The tensions between Catholics and secularists in this period had a number of potentially beneficial effects on primary education. In some areas, competition between lay and congregational schools, as well as that between Catholics and Protestants, engendered a larger number of schools, each with smaller numbers of children.49 Because Catholic schools were open for more months of the year than the secular ones, their presence may also have contributed to the drive for a longer school year. The large numbers of free Catholic primary schools also stimulated the trend toward eliminating tuition for all schools, which was virtually complete before being required by an 1881 law. Finally, the congregations provided education for girls, an area that was largely neglected by public authorities.50

Competition between Catholics and secularists also fueled the creation of infant schools and assured their ultimate integration into a national education service under the Third Republic. Initially, the clergy regarded the salles d’asile with skepticism and suspicion, perceiving them as an interference in the mother-child relationship. However, once the threat of secular schools became plain, the Church hierarchy dropped all reticence with regard to the salles d’asile. Instead, they began to develop their own infant schools in the hope that, once in a Catholic preschool, a child would remain in Catholic schools throughout his or her entire education. As a result, starting in the mid-1830s, the number of salles d’asile run by nuns began to increase steadily. The congregations were largely responsible for the expansion in the number of schools in the period leading up to the Franco-Prussian war. In 1846, nuns ran less than one-fifth of the 1,489 salles d’asile. By 1867, 73 percent of 3,572 establishments were run by religious orders, giving the church a hegemonic position in the care and socialization of young children.51

Financially strapped communes often worked closely with the congregations to create and manage the infant schools in their area. In 1843, state spending accounted for 42 percent of funding for salles d’asile, with 30 percent covered by communes; in 1863, the state was paying only 9.5 percent of costs, while communes were covering 70.5 percent.52 Under these conditions, it was the congregations that made possible the expansion of institutions for young children. Priests and nuns were unmarried, and thus more willing to accept low salaries and difficult employment conditions. Religious orders often recruited, trained, and supervised personnel, thus removing these burdens from the commune. While the Ministry of Public Instruction technically oversaw the schools, much responsibility was given to the church. The relationship between the central state and the congregations was symbiotic: the state maintained its official tutelage over the education system, while the congregations maintained their independence and power.53

This collaborative relationship between state and church ended with the advent of the French Third Republic. After a humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the collapse of the French Empire ushered in a new, republican era.
Secular republicans gained the upper hand in national politics and in many local governments across France. By 1879, republicans had consolidated their hold on political power and began introducing national education legislation making schools legally obligatory for children between the ages of seven and thirteen and eliminating school tuition. Breaking the hold of the church on education was one of the state’s foremost objectives. One of the earliest pieces of education legislation in 1879 sought to break the reliance on congregations by requiring all departments to have secular teacher training schools. Laws followed in the mid-1880s that made school buildings secular and required all personnel in public schools to be laypersons. In 1889, teachers became public employees, paid by the state. A corps of state inspectors was created to assure the system’s proper functioning, again reducing dependence on church officials who had assumed this role in the past. France created a national, unified, and secular education system.54

In their determination to divest the clergy of their influence over the education of the nation’s children, republicans turned their attention to the salles d’asile, over 70 percent of which were run by congregations.55 In the new regulations of the 1880s, these programs were incorporated into the national education system as its foundation, or “first education.” They were re-baptized écoles maternelles to remove the taint of charity and care giving that was implied in the previous appellation. Newly appointed, fully anticlerical and solidly republican inspectors of the new école maternelle overhauled the schools’ pedagogy to bring them in line with republican principles. Parents were not required to send their children to the école maternelle, but it became an obligatory expense for communes as soon as enough parents petitioned to have one built in their area.56

The political fallout of the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the century only served to reinforce the republican hold on power and their influence over the education system.57 Monarchists, the Catholic clergy, and the Army resolutely stood by the conviction of Dreyfus, against the fervent defense of Dreyfus by many intellectuals, republicans, and leftists. As radical republicans secured their hold on political power at the turn of the century, they turned to liquidating enemies of the Republic. A 1901 law on associations required all congregations to seek formal approval with the state or risk dissolution and exile of its members. Few were granted recognition by an anticlerical Parliament; by 1903, more than 10,000 congregation schools run by the unauthorized religious houses were closed.58 In 1904, another law forbade members of any congregation, authorized or not, from teaching. In 1905, the government enacted the formal separation of church and state, ending the 100-year-old concordat between Napoleon and the Holy See. Henceforth, religion would be purely a private affair, receiving no subsidy or other support from the state.

The effect of these changes on the école maternelle was, initially, a drop in the availability of services. The congregations scrambled to maintain their place in the education system by any means they could. Thousands of their members for-
mally broke with their religious order, yet continued to teach in schools across France. Without access to the resources they had before, private schools struggled to keep afloat in hostile seas. The percentage of children in religiously run écoles maternelles dropped from 71.5 percent in 1882 to 1883, to 2 percent in 1912 to 1913. Secular state schools were not immediately capable of absorbing all of the students needing classrooms, as the Education Ministry could barely mobilize the resources to replace thousands of clerical schools with secular ones. One consequence was an overall drop in the number of schools available to young children. By 1910, fewer than 30 percent of children between the ages of three and six were in an école maternelle, compared to nearly 40 percent in 1900. Enrollment continued to decline throughout the interwar years, due largely to deteriorating economic conditions that hampered government spending on education and social services.

In the long term, however, the place of the école maternelle as the foundation of the French education system was secure. For one thing, the 1880s legislation had incorporated these programs into one of the most powerful ministries in France—the National Education Ministry. This ensured that the preschools were treated as part of the regular planning process. Education planners in the post–World War II period conceptualized the primary education system as a unified structure that included both obligatory elementary schools and preschools. Thus, when parents request places for their children in a nursery or primary school, this was duly recorded by local officials, who then transmitted the demands to central authorities as part of the regular planning process. Starting in the 1950s, middle- and upper-income parents began to demand places for their children in preschool programs for pedagogical reasons. The national education ministry scrambled to meet growing demand. Despite the imperative of expanding the entire education system in that period, the Ministry assured a rapid expansion in the preschool system.

Highly unionized teachers also pressured the Ministry to expand access to public preschools. The creation of the école maternelle in the 1880s alongside the new primary schools entailed the development of a corps of teachers whose training and professional identity would be bound up with that of the primary school staff. While in most countries a wide chasm separates preschool from primary school teachers, these teachers receive the same training and education in France. Once teachers gained the right to organize in unions, elementary and preschool teachers came together in the same union to fight for the common interests of their profession. Given that the education sector has long been one of the most highly unionized in France, this has been a force to be reckoned with. The teachers’ unions would become strong defenders of the preschool system, and push for its expansion in the decades following the Second World War.

Teachers would push for the expansion of these full-day programs, which fused educational and care-taking functions in a common set of services. In most Western countries, the development of early childhood education in the twentieth
century was linked to the demands of the middle class for part-day pedagogical programs. Such was not the case in France owing to early incorporation of preschools into the national education system. The forging of national education systems in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was centrally concerned with the working class. By including children under the mandatory school age of six in the mass education system, the needs of working class parents for caretaking services shaped the nature of the services available. As a result, French preschools always provided both educational and caretaking services. By contrast, in most other Western countries, early childhood education remained outside of the domain of education, far from the concerns of the mass education system and, as will be shown below, was oriented around the preferences of the middle class.

In the decades following the Second World War, the French preschool system expanded to become universally available. A strong political consensus spanning left and right underpinned the rapid creation of public preschools. Already by 1960, 91 percent of five-year-olds, 63 percent of four-year-olds, and 35 percent of three-year-old children were attending a free école maternelle from 8:30 in the morning until 4 or 4:30 in the afternoon. By the 1970s, the French preschool had become a universal right of citizenship, which was broadly admired both at home and abroad as one of the best features of the French education system. As Edgar Faure said in 1970 on the floor of the National Assembly, “There are some things that work well in France. The nursery schools are an example.”

CHURCH-STATE PARTNERSHIP IN SWEDEN

In Sweden, very different patterns of state-church relations—and the near absence of political conflicts over religion—ensured that the traditional boundaries between state and family would remain unchanged. By failing to incorporate early childhood education into the national education system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, this area was left to maternalist reformers who organized preschool programs for middle and upper class families seeking pedagogical stimulation for their children. Even in that form, the availability of these programs was extremely limited until the late 1960s. At that time, the Swedish government began a major development of day care and early education programs, but the ways in which it did so were conditioned by these earlier developments. Swedish officials were unconstrained by existing approaches to early childhood education, and easily pushed aside the small sector of preschool teachers who opposed women’s labor force participation and favored part-time services. This left the Swedish government free to develop a set of programs through the social services sector that would be entirely oriented around the needs of working mothers as part of an economic imperative to promote female labor force participation.
Observers in the early 1970s were surprised when they went to Sweden and found the lowest percentages of children in early childhood education services in the Western world. Sweden had a reputation as one of the most extensive and generous welfare states among industrialized nations. Yet, in 1968, only 2 percent of four-year-olds, 11 percent of five-year-olds, and 43 percent of six-year-olds were in preschool programs, despite extremely high demand and overflowing waiting lists. Swedish children have always started primary school later than in the rest of the OECD—at the age of seven. Another unique aspect of the Swedish early childhood care and education system is that, when the national government finally began to develop such programs, it did so entirely outside of the education system, and as part of labor market policy.

Many of the standard explanations for the lack of early education programs cannot account for the situation in Sweden. One explanation holds that, because the Swedish population was scattered across vast territories, the distances to schools were too great to be traveled by younger children. However, as noted earlier, Swedish industrialization and urbanization since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did not entail a corresponding increase in early care and education services. There was also minimal development of such services in Swedish cities such as Stockholm, where there was a clear need for such programs. Finally, France also maintained an important agricultural sector, and by 1910, the percentage of the labor force in agriculture was roughly the same as in Sweden. Yet, the countries could not be more different in their provision of services for young children in that period.

As for institutionalist explanations, the Swedish governing apparatus has been highly centralized throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and education policy has been made within a unified, national bureaucracy. Yet, this bureaucracy showed little inclination to develop child care and early education programs. Finally, one observer has employed a cultural explanation in arguing that the most likely explanation for the high age of school entry and low level of preschools in Sweden was the strong belief that the upbringing of young children should be a purely family affair. Yet, this begs the question of how these views gained strength in the political arena. How can we account for the persistence of age-old boundaries between the state and the family through much of the twentieth century?

The answer lies in the collaborative and relatively nonconflictual relationship between the established church and the state in Sweden, as in other Nordic countries, which precluded the formation of political cleavages around religion. When the Reformation came to Sweden in the sixteenth century, the Lutheran national church was subordinated to civil authority. State and church were fused, with secular political authority maintaining the upper hand. In this process, schools and universities that had been run by the Catholic Church came under central state authority in the interest of developing a layer of educated men who could serve the
state. At the same time, the National Church was heavily involved in the development of education for the broad mass of the population. Lutheranism valued putting Bibles in the hands of the people, which meant first teaching them how to read. As Lutheran churches encouraged learning in the home, Sweden had a fairly high level of literacy despite a small number of schools. Increasingly, however, local communities organized schools at the parish level. This assured substantial church influence in the schools because churches dominated the local governing councils. The local church was, in a sense, the local government. 

Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, local political authority was gradually secularized. While at times, the National Church fought these developments, Sweden was spared the kind of strife caused by the religious question in the rest of Europe. As a result, the church maintained its role in education. Education was progressively secularized over the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, but the National Church maintained an important role in the system through much of that period. The Swedish government’s 1842 Statute on Common Schools that created mass elementary schools declared the purpose of these schools to be “the fashioning of the younger generation into Christian and useful members of society.” The system of school administration thoroughly fused secular and religious authorities, as school boards consisted of a rector and at least four other members that were elected by the church assembly. Diocesan boards were above the school boards, and oversaw the development of the education system through the nineteenth century. Churches supervised the training of teachers, who were required to know the catechism, Bible history, and church singing in addition to reading, writing, geography, and other basic subjects. The educational curriculum included all these subjects as well, and religious instruction was an important component of elementary education.

Secularization of the schools, and of Swedish society, occurred slowly and relatively peacefully. While at times, conflicts flared up between Lutherans and secularists, these disagreements in no way replicated the kinds of heated, polarizing disputes that occurred in France. A “beneficent circle” of secularization occurred in Sweden, as opposed to the vicious one in France. Debates over education policy were less concerned with who should oversee and control the education system, than with whether to construct a fully democratic education system that would not separate children into different schools according to social class. In this context, there was no strong imperative in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to extend the education system down to younger and younger children, as there was little contestation over the ideological content of education.

As a result, programs for the care and education of children below the mandatory school age were left to churches and voluntary associations. Starting in the mid-1830s, charities began to create infant schools for children below age seven. Like the equivalent schools in France (salles d’asiles), these programs had a mix of custodial and pedagogical motives. By the mid-nineteenth century, charitable
actors also began to create crèches for the care of poor or abandoned infants. However, there was little state interest in any of these programs, and no jousting of any kind over who would actually shape the content and nature of these programs. The 1842 law establishing the mass education system fixed the school age at seven, and all children below that age were expected to be cared for in the home.

By not integrating such programs into the education system, the issue of early childhood education was left to bourgeois female reformers. Froebel-style kindergartens began to appear at the turn of the century in response to the growing interest of middle and upper class parents in pedagogical stimulation for their young children. As few of these mothers were in the workforce, their interest was not in care-taking programs, but in purely educational ones. The programs created offered services only for about three hours a day, and were populated by the children of bourgeois families. Starting in the early twentieth century, some public kindergartens were introduced in cities that were addressed to working class families. However, both kinds of services were much underdeveloped, despite the growing need of poor families to have someone look after young children while parents and older siblings worked outside the home.

The first national discussions of the need for state-supported early childhood care and education facilities came in the 1930s as a response to fears of population decline. However, the first state spending on preschools began only in the 1940s to provide facilities that could look after children while their mothers worked. There were few discussions of the need to expand the education system to children under the age of seven, and efforts to promote more early childhood care and education services met with strong ideological opposition in the 1940s and 1950s. Instead, the Social Democratic Party used its monopoly over political power in the 1950s to create one of the most democratic education systems in Europe, eliminating the separate schools that had always channeled children into separate education tracks according to their social background. At the same time, there were virtually no preschools and few other day care options available to parents. In the 1960s, Sweden and most of the other Nordic countries were still lagging far behind other OECD countries in the development of these programs.

This began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the issue of child care became strongly linked to that of women’s labor force participation. Labor shortages in that period led governments in nearly all Scandinavian countries to turn to married women as a pool of unused workers. While the details of the creation of the Swedish child care system in this period will not be covered here, it is important to note how the historical evolution just described enabled the rapid expansion in public policies in this later period. The weak provision of services in the education sector actually facilitated the rapid expansion of child care programs designed specifically around the needs of working parents. In France, Germany, and Sweden, preschool teachers became strong defenders of their own system. In France, this meant opposition to allowing preschools to remain open until
six or seven o’clock at night. Given the already long school day, however (8:30 A.M.-4:30 P.M.), the French écoles maternelles already serve as care-taking institutions for much of the day. In Sweden, preschool teachers also opposed services that would be open more than a few hours a day, and were advocates for traditional gender roles in the family. Given the small numbers of these teachers, however, the Swedish government easily overrode these concerns, and constructed an entirely separate program of child care services that has been run through the National Health and Welfare Bureau.87

Juxtaposing Sweden with France makes plain the forces driving how the state defined its role vis-à-vis that of the family in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Without clerical-anticlerical conflict and competition, there was little imperative to intervene in the lives of young children in Sweden. Traditional boundaries between church, state, and family would be maintained until well into the twentieth century.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN GERMANY

Features of German social and political life in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries could lead one to expect the development of early childhood education along similar lines to that of France. Social and political cleavages around religion, a sizeable Catholic minority, liberal political movements and other anticlerical forces, and the forging of a nation-state could have generated competition over education and prompted the extension of the education system down to the young children. Yet, Germany never incorporated kindergartens or other early childhood programs into the education system in the nineteenth century and, through the 1950s, the limited development of these services in West Germany was accomplished by charitable organizations. This is best explained by the nature of political cleavages in German society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The clerical-anticlerical divide in Germany was substantially weaker than in France. While education was a source of controversy at various points, it did not become the battleground for conflicts between churches and proponents of secularism. In large measure, the political weakness of German liberalism after the 1870s ensured that both the Protestant and Catholic churches maintained their role in administering the education system.

As in France, education became a tool to forge national strength in Germany as well as a site in which liberal, nationalist ideas could flourish. By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the German states already had created mandatory elementary schools. The Napoleonic invasion spurred further Prussian expansion and centralization of the system in the hopes of fortifying the nation against future attack.88 Despite attempts by the Prussian Education Ministry to maintain a corps of elementary school teachers that would be docile agents of the state, many were increasingly attracted to liberal and secularist values during the Vormärz. Elemen-
tary school teachers played a prominent role in the revolts of 1848, and one of their most important demands was to liberate elementary schools from church supervision. Later in the century, these liberal notions resurfaced when the National Liberal party led a drive for complete state sovereignty in education. The attacks on the Catholic Church during the Kulturkampf of the 1870s were centrally concerned with wresting control over education away from churches in the name of national unity.

Liberal demands for education reform extended to programs for the care and education of young children. The earliest child care centers in Germany, called Bewahranstalten, had been created by religious charities in the 1820s and 1830s to care for children whose parents could not do so and to inculcate children with religious values. Liberals championed early childhood services that were a reaction against these centers. Friedrich Froebel created the first kindergartens in the late 1830s and 1840s to be a positive supplement to the family. The kindergarten, or child garden, was to foster the positive development of young children through directed play, songs, and games that demanded not obedience and rote learning of religious doctrine but independent reasoning. Such ideas appealed to the growing middle class in the 1840s. Froebel and the kindergarten movement envisioned programs that would be available to all children as part of the education system rather than charitable, custodial programs for the poor.

Froebel’s ideas attained prominence in the 1848 upheavals, as schoolteachers and other liberals called for a secular public education system, starting with the Froebelian kindergarten. These demands prompted a vigorous crackdown in the 1850s, with an 1851 decree in Prussia that forbade the kindergarten as a conspiracy “to convert the youth of the nation to atheism.” A number of other German states persecuted and harassed kindergarten teachers and activists. The attacks were fueled by the antipathy of the established churches to the kindergartens, which posed a direct threat to their own charitable day care centers. “They are not gardens of children, but gardens of God, because we seek to plant the seed by which children can grow up in faith and virtue until they enter the garden of Paradise,” announced a brochure of the Berlin Society for the Support of Bewahranstalten. Charities linked to the Protestant and Catholic churches launched efforts to increase their own day care centers in response to the threat from the Froebel movement.

These disputes over education never produced very extensive infant schools in the nineteenth century because, in contrast to France, churches were able to maintain their privileged place in elementary school administration. A 1794 Prussian law had officially placed education under state control, yet substantial collaboration between the state and churches in the area of elementary schools continued throughout the nineteenth century and up until 1918. In Vormärz Germany, local church officials inspected schools, kept a watchful eye on the moral fitness of elementary school teachers, and often had control over hiring and firing. After the
1848 revolt, the new Prussian constitution reaffirmed that schools were subject to regulation by delegates of the state; through the rest of the century, this ensured continued church supervision. Much as in Sweden, the primary school was an extension of the parish church in many areas. Both Protestant and Catholic clergy could determine the content of school curricula, as well as the moral suitability of instructors.

With their control over education secure, there was little need for churches to develop their own system of education, and little competition that might spill over into the arena of early childhood education. The Bewahrenstalten continued to be run by churches and religiously based voluntary associations as a form of social aid to poor families, and churches maintained their dominance in providing these and other social services. Religious forces often worked to block the development of any alternative form of care or education for young children. A number of kindergarten advocates in the latter half of the nineteenth century complained that the combined opposition of the Protestant clergy and Junkers prevented the development of even private kindergartens in rural Prussia. It was also difficult to develop the Froebelian approach in southern Germany. In Bavaria, because the government supported the Catholic church-sponsored Bewahrenstalten, there was little room for any other kind of services to be created. As a result, there was little overall growth in these programs for young children. One estimate holds that 13 percent of children between the ages of three and six were in kindergartens or day care centers in the German Empire, compared with more than one-third of the children in France.

The slow development of these services also resulted from the weakness of political liberalism in Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the period leading up to the First World War. Unlike France, liberals never gained power in Germany and were unable to realize the kind of education system they desired. Crushed by the reaction in 1848, liberals persisted in their opposition to the regime through the 1860s before becoming a partner of Bismarck in the 1870s. The alliance was short-lived as the National Liberal party was shunted aside when Bismarck built a new political base with Conservatives and the Catholic Zentrum Party. The liberal education minister Adalbert Falk was pushed out of power in 1879. In the decades leading up to the First World War, liberals were politically weak and unable to impose their views in education, or in other domains. Instead, it was the Catholic Zentrum party that became one of the central forces in German politics, and its views on education predominated.

The Weimar Republic threatened to diminish the church role in both education and the social services. The Socialists that gained power in the 1918 Revolution were determined to take both sectors away from churches and create public, secular services. In 1919, a rumor spread in Protestant circles that the Prussian Ministry of Culture would nationalize child care and require kindergarten for all three-year olds. Throughout the 1920s, the Republic was plagued by conflict
between Catholic and Protestant charities on one side, and the liberal or socialist local governments on the other, each trying to secure a dominant position in the provision of social services. These conflicts were particularly strong in the arena of youth and child welfare. Observers at the time noted the competition between these groups around day care centers, kindergartens, and other services. In the latter half of the 1920s, there also were bitter battles between Christians and secularists over religious instruction in schools.

Yet, once again, churches and the religiously based voluntary sector were able to maintain their hegemonic position in education and the social services. Crippled by war reparations and the economic crisis of the early 1920s, the Weimar Republic was persistently unable to make good on the promises it made in the arena of social welfare. This was particularly true for financially devastated local governments, who were often controlled by Social Democrats and could have posed the greatest threat to the confessional charities by developing secular services. The Socialists also failed in their aim to incorporate social services in the public sector and make kindergartens the foundation of the education system. Instead, the 1922 Youth Welfare Act was a triumph for the Christian organizations, as it enshrined the principle of subsidiarity—the idea that social welfare should be provided for at the lowest possible level in the community, such as the family and churches. Early childhood services were thus relegated to independent social welfare organizations and were run by public authorities only in the event that churches and other associations were unable to do so. In addition, the Catholic Zentrumparty dominated the Ministry of Labor and assured that the national confessional charities would receive large subsidies. These organizations cultivated close relationships with the national and state ministries, which ensured their lockhold on social services provision.

Confessional groups did continue to fear public intervention in the domains of education and social services, especially at the local level. Yet, there is little evidence of a successful takeover of these areas. For example, the Weimar government failed in its drive to create secular schools. In 1931, of 52,959 elementary schools, only 295 were officially secular ones, the rest being Catholic, Protestant, or interdenominational Christian ones. The Weimar era finally saw the development of a secular corps of school inspectors. Yet, much as in Sweden at that time, local clergy were still ex officio members of school boards, which gave them continued influence over local schools. As the socialists ultimately lacked the resources to impose a public, secular education system that would include early childhood education programs, preschools were left in the hands of private charities, which imposed their vision of the programs as mere custodial aid for only a small segment of the population. In 1930, 13 percent of preschool-aged children were in day care or kindergarten programs, the same number as in 1910.

The only real increase in these programs before the 1970s occurred under National Socialism. The Nazis were interested in child care and early childhood
education programs both for their socializing potential and, during the Second World War, as day care for women working in war-time industries. The resulting expansion of services was dramatic. By 1940, 30 percent of preschool-aged children were in some kind of day care or kindergarten programs. As the Nazi regime was determined to force confessional organizations out of the business of education and the social services, the system of collaboration and cooperation between churches and the state was wiped away under National Socialism. In their assault on charitable organizations, the Nazis disrupted their collections, canceled local government subsidies to private organizations, took “genetically healthy” children away from charities, and even seized kindergartens and placed them under the auspices of the Nazi welfare organization, the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt. By 1939, 1,200 out of 4,000 Catholic kindergartens had been seized, and Protestants lost 500 of theirs. The National Youth Welfare Law was rewritten in 1939 to exclude charities from the administration of public child welfare.

After the war, the reaction against the Nazi period led to the restoration of the old system of heavy voluntary sector involvement in child welfare, education, and other social services. The principle of subsidiarity was restored as one of the founding doctrines of the West German welfare state. West German education and social services policy also was a rejection of developments in the East, as the East German regime incorporated preschool programs into the national education system and created universal day care and preschools. In West Germany, by contrast, governments touted the family as a bulwark against totalitarianism, and there was powerful opposition to state interference in the activities of churches and families in the socialization of young children. Preschools remained the responsibility of local youth welfare authorities, which meant that the religiously based voluntary sector continued to play a substantial role in managing and developing these services. Nearly 80 percent of early childhood education programs remained in the hands of church-based voluntary associations. There was little growth in these programs in the 1950s and 1960s. By 1965, 32.7 percent of preschool-aged children were in early education programs, roughly the same percentage as at the end of the Third Reich.

The continued role of voluntary associations in running preschools and other social services would shape the way in which access to early childhood education programs would expand in the 1970s. In that period, new findings in developmental psychology about the importance of a child’s early years led to demands for more preschools. There were also calls in this period for day care services that would meet the needs of working mothers. Yet, opposition by Christian democrats and the religiously based voluntary sector prevented the development of day care for working parents, and ensured that the increase in preschool services in that period would only be for part-day programs with a primarily pedagogical focus.
In sum, the education policy structures put in place in the late nineteenth century shaped the evolution of child care policy in the 1970s in all three countries. In France, these structures ensured the universalization of full-day preschool programs. In Germany, there was a great expansion in part-day pedagogical programs that would be consonant with traditional family arrangements. In Sweden, the weakness of preexisting structures left a void to be filled by public policy in the 1970s, enabling a radical departure from past practices.

CONCLUSION

Anticlericalism and the outcome of conflicts over religion at critical junctures in the development of national education systems shaped the creation of early childhood education programs in Western Europe. As nineteenth century European nation-states were forming or consolidating, the ambitions of many liberal, republican, and other left-leaning politicians and intellectuals to create a unified national system of schools clashed with the age-old educational prerogative of churches. The conflicts were greatest in France, where deep political divisions over religion fueled disputes over schools that monopolized political energies for over a century. Competition between secularists and the Catholic church over education spilled over into programs for the care and socialization of young children. The scramble to bring children into the Catholic or secular system as early as possible spurred the creation of services for young children that previously had been viewed as the responsibility of the family. The boundaries between state, church, and family were definitively altered.

In Germany and Sweden, by contrast, the boundaries endured over time precisely because of the containment or absence of conflict around religion. In Germany, the Prussian and later Imperial state succeeded in dampening disputes between Catholics and Liberals over education. Liberals, Conservatives, and Catholics all came to value a formally unified, yet confessionally segregated, education system that accorded both Protestants and Catholics an important role in overseeing and staffing their own schools. In Sweden, the Lutheran church and the state collaborated relatively peacefully in administering the state education system. Secularization of education was gradual and overshadowed by debates over democratization of primary and secondary education. In Germany and Sweden, few or even no services for the care and education of young children were incorporated into the national education system.

There are a number of intriguing similarities between these three cases and other European countries that suggest the larger applicability of these findings. In both Belgium and Italy, the founding of national education systems occurred in environments marked by strong clerical-anticlerical divisions and conflicts between secularists and churches over who would shape child socialization. Both incorporated early childhood education programs into their national education systems, although this occurred later in Italy (1920s) than in Belgium.
In the Netherlands and Austria, an accommodation was reached between religious and secular forces, and churches and the voluntary sector maintained a substantial role in running social services and education programs. Both opted for more limited, part-time programs, although considerable competition over education in the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century initially led to the development of a large sector of preschool programs. In the Scandinavian states, the fusion of church and state and the gradual, peaceful process of secularization precluded conflicts and controversies over education, and school began at the late age of 7. There would be no substantial development of child care or early education programs until the 1960s and 1970s.

This article has shown the merits of examining the underlying cleavages in a political system as determinants of public policy. For one, this approach has shed light upon a puzzle in the literature on the welfare state—the seemingly “conservative” welfare states that offer universal early childhood education services for preschool-aged children. Such an approach also enables us to explore the ideological questions at stake in the construction of education policies, and the way in which the clash of competing visions of a nation’s future shaped public policies, often in unexpected ways. Conflicts over early childhood education concerned who would shape the socialization of young children and hardly touched on the issue of women’s employment. Yet, in the long run, strong clerical-anticlerical conflicts spurred the development of public education services that would ultimately be an important source of day care for working parents. The strength of competing ideological perspectives on children and families at a critical juncture in the history of education policy would have lasting effects on public policies for young children, with important ramifications for women’s autonomy and the nature of welfare states in Western Europe.

NOTES


5. The extent to which parental leave is beneficial for women’s position in the labor force is a matter of some debate. While some see parental leave as a way to ensure greater continuity in women’s employment trajectories, others note the very high percentages of women taking parental leave and argue that these benefits simply reinforce the traditional gender division of labor. The effects of these policies is partially a function of the length and generosity of paid benefits, with long care leaves arguably diminishing the likelihood of a woman’s full reintegration into the labor force. Another criticism of parental leave is that some countries are developing more generous leaves as a way to avoid expanding public child care. See Jeanne Fagnani, *Un travail et des enfants: petits arbitrages et grands dilemmes* (Paris: Bayard Editions, 2000); Françoise Coré and Vassiliki Koutsogeorgopoulou, “Parental Leave: What and Where?” *OECD Observer* 195 (August-September 1995); Sheila B. Kamerman, “Parental Leave Policies: An Essential Ingredient in Early Childhood Education and Care Policies,” *Social Policy Report* 14, 2 (2000): 3-15.


14. For an extension of these ideas to a wider range of countries, see Morgan, *Whose Hand Rocks the Cradle?*, chaps. 1-2.
15. In East Germany, the communist regime instituted a massive build-up of kindergartens and day care centers to enable mothers to work outside the home. Since reunification, a number of these centers have been shut down, and länder in the East have struggled to keep others open in the face of financial difficulties.


19. This in no way implies that these programs are lacking in educational content. In fact, in an effort to emphasize the pedagogical dimension of these programs, the Swedish government recently moved control over the programs from the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to the Ministry of Education and Science. See Ministry of Education and Science, *Early Childhood Education and Care Policy in Sweden* (Stockholm: unpublished background note for the OECD, December 1999).

20. The same occurred in the United States, where preschool programs were developed for the middle class and have been available for only part of the day or part of the week. Even Head Start has provided largely part-time services, although this has begun to change in recent years.


23. Fagnani, *Un travail et des enfants*.


36. Ibid., 9.


38. Ultra-Montanism was a movement among West European Catholics that insisted on the absolute religious, and possibly political, primacy of the Pope, and opposed the creation of national churches or the subordination of the church to a national state.


44. Luc, *L’Invention du jeune enfant*, 42.


49. Desert “Alphabétisation et scolarisation,” 156.


52. Luc, L’Invention du jeune enfant, 37.


55. Luc, L’Invention du jeune enfant, 259.

56. Ibid., 384-93, 406-10; Dajez, Les origines, 161-5.

57. The false accusation and conviction for treason of an Alsatian Jew was the cause célèbre of the day that divided the nation into Dreyfusard and anti-Dreyfusard camps.


72. This was the argument of the Swedish delegation to the OECD, when asked about the weakness of its early childhood education system in the early 1970s. OECD, Reviews of National Policies, 46.

73. In 1910, the percentage of the labor force in agriculture was 45 percent in Sweden, and 43 percent in France. See Hettie A. Pott-Buter, Facts and Fairy Tales about Female Labor, Family and Fertility (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1993), 100.


76. These attitudes changed in the 1960s, as women entered the labor force en masse. Up until that time, however, the male breadwinner-female caregiver model of social relations predominated in Sweden.


82. Boli, New Citizens for a New Society, 227, 241-2; Gustafsson, “Religious Change,” 145. See also David Martin, “Notes for a General Theory of Secularisation,” Archives Européennes de Sociologie 10, no. 2 (1969): 192-201. In contrast to the abrupt and contentious separation of church and state in France in 1905, it was only in January 2000 that Sweden quietly enacted the formal separation of the two.


92. Ibid., 439.


100. Tietze et al., “Child Care and Early Education in the Federal Republic of Germany.”

101. Craig, *Germany, 76-8, 91-71*


110. Samuel and Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Germany, 100.


113. Samuel and Thomas, Education and Society in Modern Germany, 100.


115. Ibid., 229.


118. The Austrian case bears interesting historical similarities to the German one, with periods of sharp conflict between the church and secularizing liberals over education, yet the ultimate triumph of clerical forces in a number of these disputes. Anticlericalism and political liberalism were politically weaker in Austria than in a country such as France. See Michael J. Zeps, Education and the Crisis of the First Republic (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1987); on the Netherlands, see Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, 2 (January 1969): 207-25; Blackstone, “Some Aspects of the Structure and Extent of Nursery Education,” 95-6.